A Cold Warrior Turns

In the opening chapter of JFK and the Unspeakable, James W. Douglass explores John F. Kennedy's transformation from a conventional Cold War politician to a leader seeking peace, a shift that ultimately marked him as a threat to powerful forces within the U.S. government. The chapter begins by outlining Kennedy's early life, shaped by his privileged upbringing, chronic illnesses, and World War II experiences, including his heroic actions as a PT boat commander. These experiences instilled in him a deep aversion to war, contrasting with the aggressive militarism of the Cold War era.

Initially, as a senator and early president, Kennedy adhered to Cold War norms, supporting military buildup and anti-communist policies. However, his presidency, starting in January 1961, coincided with escalating global tensions, including the Cuban Missile Crisis and conflicts in Laos and Vietnam. A pivotal moment came with the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, a CIA-orchestrated operation that Kennedy inherited from the Eisenhower administration. When the invasion failed, Kennedy refused to escalate it with U.S. troops, revealing his distrust of the CIA and military advisors who had misled him. This event sparked his desire to "splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds," signaling a break from the national security establishment.

Douglass highlights Kennedy's growing resistance to military solutions, exemplified by his rejection of Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals for preemptive nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, notably during a July 1961 National Security Council meeting. His interactions with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, particularly during the Vienna summit in June 1961, furthered this shift. Despite initial tensions, their agreement on a neutral Laos hinted at Kennedy's willingness to pursue diplomacy over confrontation.

The chapter also introduces Thomas Merton, a Trappist monk whose writings on peace and the "Unspeakable"—a term for systemic evil—frame the narrative. Merton’s correspondence with Kennedy’s sister-in-law, Ethel, and his prophetic warnings about the consequences of seeking peace underscore the spiritual dimension of JFK’s journey. Douglass argues that Kennedy’s turn toward peace, rooted in dialogue with adversaries like Khrushchev, set him against the military-industrial complex Eisenhower had warned about, laying the groundwork for his eventual assassination.

By the end of the chapter, Kennedy emerges as a leader beginning to transcend Cold War ideology, driven by a personal evolution and a desire to avert nuclear catastrophe. This transformation, Douglass suggests, made him a target of the "Unspeakable," a force that would not tolerate his deviation from the established order.

Kennedy, Castro, and the CIA

Chapter 2 of JFK and the Unspeakable delves into John F. Kennedy's complex and evolving relationship with Cuba, Fidel Castro, and the CIA, illustrating how his pursuit of peace clashed with the agency’s relentless anti-Castro agenda. Douglass frames this conflict as a critical factor in Kennedy’s assassination, highlighting the CIA’s role as a key component of the "Unspeakable."

The chapter begins with the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, where Kennedy’s refusal to authorize a full U.S. invasion alienated the CIA and Cuban exiles, who felt betrayed. This incident deepened Kennedy’s mistrust of the agency, leading him to issue National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) 55 and 57 to curb CIA autonomy and shift covert operations to military oversight. However, the CIA, under leaders like Allen Dulles, resisted these efforts, continuing its covert war against Castro through operations like "Operation Mongoose," authorized by Kennedy in November 1961 under pressure but intended to be tightly controlled.

Douglass details the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 as a turning point. Kennedy’s discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, placed there partly due to U.S. threats, brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Despite intense pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA hawks like Curtis LeMay to bomb Cuba, Kennedy opted for a naval blockade and secret negotiations with Khrushchev. His decision to trade the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey for Soviet withdrawal from Cuba—kept secret from his advisors—averted disaster and marked a significant step toward détente. This act of diplomacy enraged military and CIA hardliners, who viewed it as appeasement.

Post-crisis, Kennedy’s attitude toward Cuba softened. Douglass reveals how JFK initiated secret back-channel communications with Castro in 1963, facilitated by figures like journalist Lisa Howard and UN diplomat William Attwood. These efforts aimed at normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations, a radical departure from the CIA’s goal of regime change. Simultaneously, the CIA continued plotting Castro’s assassination, including a bizarre scheme involving a contaminated diving suit, unbeknownst to Kennedy, who was unwittingly implicated via negotiator James Donovan.

The chapter also examines Lee Harvey Oswald’s ambiguous role, suggesting he was a CIA asset manipulated to link Kennedy’s death to Castro. Oswald’s pro-Castro activities in New Orleans, orchestrated by CIA operatives like David Atlee Phillips, were designed to create a pretext for retaliation against Cuba after the assassination. However, Kennedy’s outreach to Castro undermined this narrative, further isolating him from the agency.

Douglass argues that Kennedy’s turn toward reconciliation with Castro, alongside his resistance to CIA schemes, made him a liability to the national security state. The chapter portrays a president increasingly at odds with an agency determined to maintain Cold War hostilities, setting the stage for the fatal confrontation in Dallas.

JFK and Vietnam

Chapter 3 of JFK and the Unspeakable examines John F. Kennedy’s evolving stance on Vietnam, portraying his resistance to escalating U.S. military involvement as a pivotal reason for his assassination. James W. Douglass argues that Kennedy’s commitment to withdrawing U.S. forces clashed with the ambitions of the military-industrial complex and the CIA, marking him as a threat to the Cold War status quo.

The chapter opens with Kennedy’s early presidency, where he inherited a volatile situation in Southeast Asia from Dwight D. Eisenhower. In January 1961, Eisenhower advised military intervention in Laos to counter communist influence, but Kennedy rejected this, opting instead for a neutral Laos agreement with Nikita Khrushchev at the 1961 Vienna summit. This decision signaled his preference for diplomacy over war, a stance he extended to Vietnam despite pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA.

Douglass traces Kennedy’s growing skepticism about Vietnam, influenced by advisors like Senator Mike Mansfield and Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith, who warned against a quagmire akin to France’s defeat there. Initially, Kennedy approved sending military advisors in November 1961, but he consistently refused to deploy combat troops, a decision that frustrated military leaders like General Lyman Lemnitzer. The 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos reinforced his push for neutrality, though the CIA undermined this by supporting anti-communist factions.

A critical shift occurred in 1962-1963 as Kennedy sought to disengage from Vietnam. Douglass highlights the May 1962 Saigon conference, where Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, under JFK’s directive, ordered General Paul Harkins to plan a phased withdrawal, aiming to turn the war over to South Vietnam. This plan faced resistance from the Pentagon and CIA, who ignored or delayed its implementation. By May 1963, at another conference in Hawaii, Kennedy secured a concrete withdrawal timeline, culminating in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 263 in October 1963, which authorized the removal of 1,000 U.S. personnel by year’s end.

The chapter also explores the 1963 Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam, where CIA-supplied plastic explosives were used to frame the Viet Cong, destabilizing Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime. Kennedy’s refusal to abandon Diem and his push for withdrawal were at odds with CIA and military desires for escalation. Douglass notes that Kennedy’s isolation grew as he lost control over policy, with advisors like Roger Hilsman and Averell Harriman drafting a coup-endorsing telegram in August 1963 without his full consent.

Kennedy’s public and private statements, including interviews with Walter Cronkite and Chet Huntley in September 1963, affirmed his intent to avoid a deeper war, emphasizing Vietnamese self-reliance. Douglass argues that this stance, combined with his peace initiatives elsewhere, made him a target of the "Unspeakable"—a systemic force within the national security state that saw his policies as treasonous. The chapter sets the stage for the coup against Diem and Kennedy’s own fate, underscoring his doomed effort to avert a full-scale Vietnam War.

Marked Out for Assassination

Chapter 4 of JFK and the Unspeakable details the mounting evidence that John F. Kennedy was targeted for assassination due to his divergence from Cold War orthodoxy, focusing on the period from mid-1963 onward. James W. Douglass argues that JFK’s peace initiatives—particularly his American University address, the nuclear test ban treaty, and his secret dialogues with Khrushchev and Castro—positioned him as a traitor in the eyes of the national security state, setting the stage for his elimination.

The chapter begins with Kennedy’s June 10, 1963, American University speech, where he called for an end to the Cold War and proposed a "peace race" with the Soviet Union, rejecting a Pax Americana enforced by military might. This vision, coupled with his unilateral suspension of atmospheric nuclear tests, alarmed the military-industrial complex and CIA, who saw it as a betrayal of their anti-communist agenda. Douglass notes that the speech’s broadcast in the Soviet Union and Khrushchev’s praise for it deepened this rift.

Kennedy’s pursuit of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, finalized in July 1963, further antagonized military leaders like General Curtis LeMay, who opposed any disarmament. Public support for the treaty, alongside JFK’s secret outreach to Castro via Lisa Howard and William Attwood, intensified the perception of him as a security risk. Douglass highlights how the CIA, under figures like Desmond FitzGerald, continued plotting Castro’s assassination, undermining Kennedy’s reconciliation efforts.

The chapter introduces Lee Harvey Oswald as a pawn in the assassination plot, manipulated by the CIA to serve as a scapegoat. Douglass examines Oswald’s activities in New Orleans in the summer of 1963, where his pro-Castro leafleting with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee—linked to CIA operative David Atlee Phillips—created a false narrative of communist allegiance. His September 1963 encounter with Silvia Odio, a Cuban exile, alongside two anti-Castro operatives, suggests he was being framed as a pro-Castro assassin, a setup the CIA could exploit post-assassination to justify war with Cuba.

Douglass also uncovers a parallel plot involving U.S. counterintelligence agent Richard Case Nagell, who infiltrated an assassination conspiracy in 1963. Nagell’s arrest in September after firing shots in a bank—intended to distance himself from the plot—revealed his knowledge of Oswald’s role and CIA involvement, though his warnings were ignored. This, alongside the CIA’s sabotage of Kennedy’s Vietnam withdrawal (NSAM 263) and the steel crisis backlash from big business, painted a picture of a president increasingly isolated.

By late 1963, Kennedy’s turn toward peace—evident in his rejection of preemptive nuclear strikes and his empathy for Soviet suffering—marked him for death. Douglass ties this to Thomas Merton’s prophecy that a leader embracing such humanity would be "marked out for assassination," arguing that JFK’s policies threatened the "Unspeakable" power structure, culminating in the plans that would unfold in Dallas.

Saigon and Chicago

Chapter 5 of JFK and the Unspeakable explores two critical events in late 1963 that James W. Douglass argues were precursors to John F. Kennedy’s assassination: the coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon and a thwarted assassination plot against JFK in Chicago. These incidents highlight the growing rift between Kennedy and the national security state, particularly the CIA, as he pursued peace over war.

The chapter begins with the August 24, 1963, telegram drafted by advisors Roger Hilsman, Averell Harriman, and Michael Forrestal, conditionally endorsing a coup against Diem. Sent while Kennedy was away in Hyannis Port, this hasty decision—approved without his full deliberation—reflected his loss of control over subordinates aligned with CIA interests. Douglass details how the CIA, frustrated by Kennedy’s Vietnam withdrawal plans (NSAM 263) and Diem’s resistance to U.S. escalation, orchestrated the coup. On November 1, 1963, Diem and his brother Nhu were overthrown and murdered, an outcome Kennedy regretted but could not prevent. This event, Douglass argues, signaled to the "Unspeakable" that dissenters could be eliminated, foreshadowing JFK’s fate.

Simultaneously, a parallel plot unfolded in Chicago. Douglass uncovers a planned assassination attempt on Kennedy during his scheduled November 2, 1963, visit for an Army-Air Force football game. The scheme involved a scapegoat, Thomas Arthur Vallee, a disaffected ex-Marine with anti-Kennedy views, eerily similar to Lee Harvey Oswald. Vallee was monitored by Chicago police and arrested on a pretext, while two suspected snipers—part of a four-man team—were detained but released after Secret Service intervention. A last-minute tip from an informant named "Lee" halted the plot, prompting Kennedy to cancel his trip.

The Chicago plot’s parallels to Dallas—Vallee’s profile mirroring Oswald’s, the involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, and Secret Service complicity—suggest a coordinated effort by intelligence forces. Douglass ties this to Kennedy’s peace initiatives, including his American University address and secret dialogues with Khrushchev and Castro, which alienated the CIA and military. The chapter also notes Abraham Bolden, the first Black Secret Service agent, who faced retaliation for exposing agency corruption linked to the plot, further evidencing internal resistance to JFK.

Douglass argues that the Saigon coup and Chicago attempt were rehearsals for Dallas, driven by the same "Unspeakable" forces opposing Kennedy’s turn from Cold War belligerence. The successful removal of Diem and the near-miss in Chicago emboldened these forces, setting the stage for November 22, 1963, when Kennedy’s isolation and vulnerability would prove fatal.

Washington and Dallas

Chapter 6 of JFK and the Unspeakable culminates in the assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, weaving together the political tensions in Washington and the detailed events in Dealey Plaza. James W. Douglass argues that JFK’s relentless pursuit of peace—against the entrenched interests of the military-industrial complex, CIA, and national security state—led to his execution by the "Unspeakable," a systemic evil that silenced his vision.

The chapter opens in Washington, where Kennedy’s final months were marked by bold peace initiatives. His October 1963 approval of NSAM 263 to withdraw 1,000 troops from Vietnam by year’s end defied Pentagon and CIA resistance. Secret dialogues with Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, alongside the Limited Test Ban Treaty’s Senate ratification in September, intensified perceptions of JFK as a traitor to Cold War orthodoxy. Douglass highlights Kennedy’s isolation, as advisors like Robert McNamara supported his withdrawal plans, but the CIA and Joint Chiefs pushed for escalation, evidenced by their September 1963 report advocating a nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union—a proposal JFK rejected.

In Dallas, Douglass meticulously reconstructs the assassination, drawing on witness testimonies and suppressed evidence. He describes a conspiracy involving multiple shooters, with Lee Harvey Oswald as a patsy. Witnesses like Julia Ann Mercer saw a man with a rifle near the grassy knoll, while Ed Hoffman observed a shooter there, supported by Secret Service impostors in Dealey Plaza. Oswald’s actions—leaving the Texas School Book Depository, his arrest at the Texas Theatre, and the murder of Officer J.D. Tippit—are portrayed as環保

Douglass suggests Oswald was flown out of Dallas on a CIA plane, as recounted by Air Force Sergeant Robert Vinson, reinforcing the idea of two Oswalds—one a scapegoat, the other an intelligence operative. The medical cover-up at Bethesda Naval Hospital, including altered autopsy evidence and the mysterious death of photographer William Bruce Pitzer, further conceals the truth of multiple gunshot wounds inconsistent with the lone gunman narrative.

The chapter ties Washington’s political machinations to Dallas’s execution, arguing that Kennedy’s enemies—within the CIA, military, and big business—orchestrated his death. Jack Ruby’s silencing of Oswald, linked to CIA and Mafia ties, and the immediate cover-up by the FBI and Secret Service, solidified the official story. Douglass concludes that Kennedy’s martyrdom for peace, echoing Thomas Merton’s warnings, left a legacy of truth suppressed by the "Unspeakable," with implications for ongoing U.S. militarism.